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ABSTRACT 
Taking Carroll‘s ―Jabberwocky‖ as emblematic of a text historically enjoyed by both children and adults, this article 
seeks to place the text in what Kristeva defines as the borderline between language and subjectivity to theorize a 
realm in which ambivalent texts emerge as such. The fact that children‘s literature remains largely trapped in the 
literary–didactic split in which these texts are understood as either learning materials and primers for literacy, or as 
examples of poetic or historical modernist discourse. This article situates Carroll‘s text in the theories of language, 
subjectivity, and clinical discourse toward a more complex reading of a children‘s poem, one that finds a point of 
intersection between the adult and the child reader. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Maria Nikolajeka demonstrates that children‘s literature occupies a middle place in the world of 
literary studies. Children‘s literature is either studied exclusively as a didactic tool—a literary 
form that exists entirely to provide stepping stones toward literacy for young readers—or else 
children‘s literature is understood as a projection of the author‘s imagination, a nostalgic portrait 
of some feature of the author‘s own youth. This is commonly referred to as the ―literary–didactic 
split‖ (Nikolajeka, 2005: xi). Indeed, a cursory search of academic databases turns up few 
strictly critical studies of Lewis Carroll‘s Through  
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the Looking Glass, for example. Most critical works appear in journals such as The Journal of 
Education, or else the literary critical analyses are quite old, some dating back as far as the 
1980s. Indeed, Vallone (1998: 138) writes of the ―intermittent acceptance‖ of children‘s 
literature as a legitimate object of study in literary scholarship. Kutzer (1991: 719) explains that 
even teaching children‘s literature at the college level requires a mode of interpretation other 
than the strictly literary, such as the history of childhood. At the other end of the literary–
didactic split is the fundamental question of what constitutes literature. Taking as bookends 
Monroe Beardsley‘s definition that literature is a work that contains content that is, to a 
significant degree, implicit (Beardsley, 1981), and Bourdieu‘s sociological critique that would 
locate all claims to ―literary-ness‖ as functions of the circulation of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 
1984: 4), we would be left in a no-man‘s land in which a firm understanding of children‘s 
literature would become a meaningless question.   
Indeed, a survey of literary scholarship reveals that children‘s literature remains trapped in 
this literary–didactic split. Even studies that propose to directly define children‘s literature as a 
unified genre fail because there is no agreement as to what constitutes ―children‘s literature‖. 
Gubar (2011: 210) makes it abundantly clear that scholars of children‘s literature cannot 
surmount questions of the nature of childhood, fundamental assumptions regarding the adult 
understanding of childhood, and historical problems that make it impossible to assign pre-
modern texts to either child readers or adult readers.1 Gubar proposes that ―a productive middle 
ground exists between the extreme positions adopted by the definers and the antidefiners‖ of 
children‘s literature, one that dispenses with essentialist definitions of children‘s literature, and 
an opposing view that denies any real category that can be strictly called children‘s literature 
(Gubar, 2011: 210–11). This article offers an examination of Lewis Carroll‘s ―Jabberwocky‖ as 
a notable example of a literary text that has historically crossed the line as a text read by both 
adults and children. These texts reveal a border area in literary analysis in which the line 
between children‘s stories that dwell principally in the fantastic, and adult texts that engage in 
complex semantic games, is itself a serious game. Specifically, the assumption that the meanings 
contained in children‘s literature are largely explicit, and that the line that places a work in the 
domain of the literary is in some measure implicit, is a false assumption. Children‘s literature 
may well contain implicit meanings that require external intervention to fully grasp. Nonsense 
language provides a realm in which we may examine the border region where a text widely 
regarded as a children‘s text operates with linguistic mechanisms that far exceed its obvious 
content. In other words, the use of nonsense language and poetic forms reveals something 
critical about the use of language in literary texts more generally, and this linguistic game has 
everything to with the acquisition of language and subjectivity. It is in this region of language 
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and linguistic confusion that the implicit aspects of children‘s literature are revealed. Nonsense 
poems operate in a realm of language that shares features with both the onset of language 
acquisition and the forms of nonsense that are symptomatic of insanity, and this blurred region 
of language adds a dimension to our understanding of children‘s literature in the larger context 
of literary scholarship.  
The goal of this article is to situate Carroll‘s Through the Looking Glass within the context 
of critical cultural studies more than as an example of children‘s story. Its aim is to circumvent 
the simple literary–didactic split and locate these texts in the discourse of literary studies more 
generally. Carroll‘s nonsense poems are seen as either fitting nicely into the box of quaint stories 
intended for the amusement of children and reproduced into Disney ideals, or else they evoke 
Victorian cultural anxieties regarding language as becoming detached from a fixed reference 
(Williams, 2013). These anxieties over language reveal further problems with Carroll‘s own 
logic, and demonstrates a metalanguage that defies conventional logic in which ―the dialogue 
between logic and literature seems to develop between the two poles of conscious and 
unconscious knowledge‖ (Marret, 1993: 217). And yet, these types of analyses lead others to 
place Carroll‘s nonsense poems in the larger discourse of modernism (Rother, 1974). Finally, 
Carroll‘s nonsense poetry can be interpreted as symptomatic of Victorian concerns with 
childhood psychology (Schatz, 2015: 96). In this last case, the poems themselves stand as 
symptoms of psychological disturbance.2 We may also allow for Michael Holquist‘s assessment 
of Carroll‘s poetic system in The Hunting of the Snark, that ―it best dramatized the attempt of an 
author to insure through the structure of his work that the work could be perceived only as what 
it was, and not some other thing; the attempt to create an immaculate fiction, a fiction that resists 
the attempts of readers, and especially those readers who write criticism, to turn it into an 
allegory, a system equitable with already existing systems in the non-fictive world‖ (Holquist, 
1999). This would place ―Jabberwocky‖ in a singular place wherein it is comparable only to 
itself. However, Holquist links Carroll‘s poetic wordplay with other modernist authors who 
produced singular worlds that are valued in ways that are distinctly a part of the literary 
establishment. In placing Carroll‘s ―Jabberwocky‖ in relation to Antonin Artaud‘s attempt to 
translate the poem, the current paper will demonstrate that the poem reveals a borderline in the 
unconscious wherein language is not fully regulated. It is on this borderline where the immature 
reader and the adult reader find a point of common interpretive understanding.  
 
2. THE LINGUISTIC BORDER AND “JABBERWOCKY” 
Julia Kristeva (1982) theorized the notion that the border between language and the non-
linguistic is preserved in the human psyche. At the border between the fully integrated self and 
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the pre-linguistic infant psyche, there emerge forms of expression that do not properly constitute 
language, but operate within the terrain of language. Nonsense words, empty sounds, and 
echolalia do not convey meaning in a conventional sense. Nevertheless, these things border on 
meaning, and become meaningful within a specific context. These are sounds that convey 
meaning where ―something irreducible to language emerges‖ (Barzilai, 1991: 296). This is a 
complex psychoanalytic concept, but this theory reveals a preserved psychic space that remains, 
albeit repressed, and escapes into linguistic formations that clearly resemble conventional 
language even as it flouts the norms and rules of conventional language.  
Barzilai locates one specific case to exemplify Kristeva‘s theory in relation to literary 
production: the prelinguistic infantile stage of language acquisition. As the infant is ushered into 
language and subjectivity, there is a period in which the child experiments with language in 
forms such as echolalia, glossolalia, and other linguistic but nonsensical utterances. The phases 
of childhood language acquisition fall into ―several recognizable but overlapping 
phenomenological stages, namely, (a) prelingual, (b) random articulation or babbling, (c) 
lalation, (d) imitation (echolalia), and (e) articulate utterance (including symbol formation)‖ 
(Eveloff, 1971: 1897). We can see nearly all of these at various points in ―Jabberwocky.‖ 
Echolalia is of particular importance, since it demonstrates a phase in which the child begins to 
match their own utterances with the utterances of adults. We can recognize examples of 
echolalia in ―Jabberwocky‖ with words that resemble the sounds and actions that animate the 
poem. For example:  
 
One-two! One-two! And through and through 
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack! 
He left it dead, and with its head 
He went galumphing back. 
 
No matter the translation we later receive from Humpty Dumpty, these lines operate in the 
manner of echolalia of poetic language found in adult literature such as Beowulf. The play with 
consonants and vowels resembles the translation of heroic language from the ancient Anglo-
Saxon epic. Compare this line with couplets from Beowulf: 
 
There would be no monsters gnawing and gloating  
Over their banquet at the bottom of the sea.  
Instead, in the morning, mangled and sleeping  
The sleep of the sword, they slopped and floated  
Like the ocean‘s leavings.
3
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We see close associations with the alliterative nonsense in ―snicker-snack with‖ ―morning, 
mangled.‖ The word ―vorpal‖ shares phonic associations with the open vowels contained in the 
lines from this translation of Beowulf, even as this language is tied to the same images of 
monsters. While Beowulf uses sophisticated poetic language, ―Jabberwocky‖ mimics this 
language in ways that are strikingly similar to the way children mimic adult language in the form 
of echolalia.   
This infantile use of language would remain a passing phase and even an exception but for 
Kristeva‘s assertion that this phase of language acquisition is preserved in the unconscious. This 
borderline is revealed in forms of madness and schizophrenia in which patients lose touch with 
the unconscious symbolic structures which underpin semiotic functions. As one approaches this 
borderline space, in a healthy ego it elicits fear, but in an ego that has become unraveled through 
mental illness, this borderline space can become explicitly articulated in the form of nonsense 
and delusional speech. Since this borderline is in fact preserved in all speaking subjects, it defies 
the clinical and the medical and is manifest in aesthetic forms. In Kristeva‘s formulation (1982: 
7), ―borderline subjects and their speech constitute propitious ground for a sublimating discourse 
(‗aesthetic‘ or ‗mystical,‘ etc.), rather than a scientific or rationalist one.‖ This theory opens the 
possibility that nonsense poems such as Carroll‘s and others are in fact marvelous aesthetic 
achievements rather than merely fantastic children‘s playthings or nostalgic projections from 
adult authors.  
 
3. PRESERVING THE BORDER IN NONSENSE POETRY 
The children‘s stories and poems that seem to occupy the popular imagination with the most 
lasting impact are those texts that can transcend the narrow confines of children‘s literature and 
find a broader audience by also appealing to adult readers. These texts manage to provide the 
child reader (or listener) with a captivating tale while they convey depths of meaning that equally 
captivate a mature reader. Shavit (1991) describes these as ambivalent texts not so much in the 
sense that they cannot be properly placed, but because they offer more than one voice, which 
reaches the reader on different levels depending on how the text is read. To say that the 
ambivalent text simply finds common ground between the adult and the young reader is a vast 
oversimplification. Ambivalent texts reach two fields of understanding, both of which have 
specific criteria by which they provide meaningful messages, albeit for entirely different reasons. 
Though the child reader may well require conventional modes of meaning, these modes are 
nevertheless rich in cognitive content. The adult reader demands a different mode, which reaches 
a more complex cognitive space—the text carries some deformation of the obvious conventional 
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mode, which allows for greater complexity than is immediately apparent. These deformations 
can be achieved in several ways:  
 
While one of the models is conventional, more established and thus addresses the child 
reader, the other, addressing the adult-reader, is less established, more sophisticated, and 
sometimes based on the deformation of the more established model. The deformation of the 
latter is accomplished in several ways: parodization of some elements; bringing into the 
model new elements; changing the motivation for existing elements; changing the functions 
and hierarchy of elements; changing the segmentation of the text; breaking the rules of time 
and space, etc. (Shavit, 1991: 78). 
 
The current article suggests that these types of deformations can be broken down further 
into sub-categories. For example, the use of a conventional poetic form can remain completely 
intact, even as the content that fills that form defies basic rules of meaning. In the case of 
nonsense poems like ―Jabberwocky,‖ we have an obvious poetic form that is easily recognizable 
even to an immature reader, but many of the words themselves are complete gibberish. 
Nevertheless, the meaning of ―Jabberwocky‖ comes through. For the child reader, the appeal 
may be the nonsense language itself. For the adult reader, the poem presents a puzzle that almost 
demands to be taken quite seriously even as it retains the childlike love of nonsense. The exact 
nature of the ambivalence of these texts remains at a level that may not be obviously apparent to 
either the child or the adult reader. Rather than fitting neatly into one category or another, 
nonsense poems blur the line between simple amusement and serious literary/cultural issues.  
In ―Jabberwocky,‖ its word formations, rhyme and meter, and suggestions of verbal 
structures make it clear to the adult reader that this is a narrative poem. Something akin to 
Beowulf emerges in the tone and movement of the poem. Carroll himself provided such an 
explanation in an earlier version of the first stanza that appeared in a private, handwritten 
magazine. He explained that the poem was ―a curious fragment‖ and a ―stanza of Anglo-Saxon 
poetry‖ (Carroll, 1931: 328). The nonsense words in the opening stanza are explained, 
humorously, as archaic usages of known words. Carroll‘s mock exegesis resembles what we get 
from Humpty Dumpty in the finished version of Through the Looking-Glass, and for this reason 
we must read these explanations as part of the fun. And yet the poem makes sense in terms of the 
joke itself. While ancient Anglo-Saxon alliterations remain in the forms of ―gyre and gimble,‖ 
Carroll‘s nonsense version relies on modern rhyme over ancient alliteration. By borrowing and 
manipulating the ancient formal qualities of this type of poem, Carroll lulls us into a tacit faith in 
the validity of the nonsense as ancient Anglo-Saxon verse: 
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‘Twas brillig, and the slithy toves 
 Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogroves, 
And the mome raths outgrabe.  
 
We see the mix of modern rhyme in the alternating lines and the ancient alliteration 
contained in the lines. Even without consulting either Carroll‘s or Humpty Dumpty‘s explanation 
of the nonsense words, we can recognize the form of an ancient heroic poem. Clearly, Carroll‘s 
poem demands at least two responses: either we read the poem as a type of linguistic play, as a 
child reader would, or we are compelled to decode the poem using other intellectual tools, as 
adult readers would. Either it is merely playful, or it is a puzzle. 
The opening line is a description of conditions. Although we cannot properly know the 
meanings of ―brillig‖ or ―slithy,‖ we can safely conjecture that they are adjectives that describe 
the conditions of the opening scene. This shows us that even in the absence of linguistic 
coherence, we can determine some kind of meaning based on the arrangement of terms and the 
formation of the words. Context, suffixes, word order, metrical arrangements—all allow us to 
make some sense of the nonsense of the lines. Raymond J. Rundus offers a clear analysis of 
some parts of some of ―Jabberowcky‖ from the vantage point of a linguist: 
 
Carroll has retained the function words of the English language (determiners, prepositions, 
expletives, conjunctions, auxiliary verbs) while filling the remaining slots with ―nonsense‖ 
words whose grammatical function is signaled syntactically and/or by inflection. Thus 
―gyre‖ and ―gimble‖ are both clearly parts of a compound predicate because of their position 
following the common English auxiliary ―did‖ and their being linked by the coordinate 
―and.‖ Syntactically, ―toves‖ must be a noun because it follows both the determiner ―the‖ 
and ―slithy,‖ which is given adjectival force because of its ―-y‖ suffix, and also because 
―toves‖ precedes and clearly governs the compound predicate. (Rundus, 1967: 958–959) 
 
That a strict linguistic analysis reveals such a wealth of information about a poem 
composed entirely of pure nonsense tells us that there is much more going on in the poem than 
pure nonsense. It certainly carries tremendous weight as a cultural artifact. In ―Jabberwocky,‖ 
we tap into a wealth of linguistic and syntactical formations, which can be sorted into categories 
of understanding. 
For the child reader, the play of these words resembles the nonsense uttered by young 
children as they come to learn language. Made-up words that sound like real words, and 
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overblown importance in language that they know to be silly, are characteristic of children‘s 
word games. The poem operates on the level of childhood make-believe, complete with a make-
believe language attending the children‘s tale of adventure.  
More significant for our purposes is where the child reader and the mature reader overlap. 
We find this point of contact in Humpty Dumpty‘s explanation of the poem. The logical leaps 
and reasoning applied by Humpty Dumpty reveal an interpretive strategy that is more complex 
than it first appears. Alice asks Humpty Dumpty to explain the poem since she cannot properly 
understand it on her own. Humpty Dumpty has already told us his position on the meanings of 
words: 
 
―When I use a word,‖ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ―it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.‖ 
―The question is,‖ said Alice, ―whether you can make words mean different things.‖ 
―The question is,‖ said Humpty Dumpty, ―which is to be master—that‘s all‖.  
 
Rather than address Alice‘s questions, Humpty Dumpty‘s explanation further complicates 
the problem of language in the poem, adopting a position that does not relate to the language of 
the poem. The emphasis on ―I‖ steers our attention away from the language of the poem and 
directs us to Humpty Dumpty. This is itself a nonsense linguistic maneuver. His claims to 
control language from a position of singular mastery indicates another level of nonsense in the 
story. We have a nonsense poem, and a translation that is as unintelligible as the poem. Humpty 
Dumpty operates independent of any social linguistic determinants as he sets himself apart from 
the way language functions. This moment is a mirror of what we see in Antonin Artaud‘s 
attempt to translate ―Jabberwocky‖: as part of a children‘s story, it is simple fantasy and make-
believe; as a feature of how one gains access to language, it is symptomatic of a psychotic 
breakdown. This can be seen as a deliberate, imaginative analogue of a psychotic break, as 
Humpty Dumpty proceeds according to a private logic that remains outside of the proper 
linguistic function. One clear symptom of schizophrenia is ―formal thought disorder (manifest as 
disorganized speech, including the use of unusual words or phrases, and neologisms)‖ (Howes, 
Weinstein, Tabraham, Valmaggia, Broome & McGuire, 2007: 1294). The linguistic maneuver 
characterized by the alleged mastery that Humpty Dumpty claims over language is in fact a 
further occlusion of meaning. Humpty Dumpty does not ―master‖ the language of the poem. 
Rather, he assumes the mastery of unusual words or phrases and neologisms. His translation and 
exegesis are symptoms of schizophrenia, while the nonsense words remain nonsensical. 
The issues that attend the private logic regarding language become more intractable even 
as they become ostensibly more intelligible. As Humpty Dumpty explains the language of the 
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poem, he takes logical leaps that reveal workings in the text that are like the borderlines defined 
above. Alice recites the first stanza of the poem, and Humpty Dumpty interrupts her: ―‗That‘s 
enough to begin with,‘ Humpty Dumpty interrupted: ‗there are plenty of hard words there. 
―Brillig‖ means four o‘clock in the afternoon—the time when you begin broiling things for 
dinner‘‖.  
Here we see the application of the form of linguistic analysis without the meaningful 
content of this type of analysis. That is, Humpty Dumpty can access the formal procedure of a 
rational process without having access to the constituent features that define this type of analysis. 
It is as if he applied the schemata of a medical diagnosis without utilizing the process of 
deduction from symptoms that produces a legitimate medical diagnosis. If we allow for his 
association between the consonants ―br-‖ and any other word pronounced in a similar way, we 
can see how his analysis works. But this is simply not how this kind of work is done. Humpty 
Dumpty arrives at these conclusions not through mastery but rather through an absolute refusal 
of mastery. It is too easy to say that texts such as these reach a nostalgic place in the heart of the 
adult reader. There is something far more complex in these texts precisely because these texts are 
distinguished as ambivalent texts. They are children‘s poems and they are also adult texts, 
because they reach a region of thought that is common to both communities of readers without 
either being entirely aware of the forms of thought. Our ability to simultaneously recognize 
nonsense and place the formal attributes of the text in a conventional arrangement indicates the 
presence of a space of understanding that lies at the border of both regions of comprehension. 
This border region can be elucidated by considering the role of nonsense in the very process of 
making sense. That region of nonsense that is symptomatic of mental illness can shed light on 
the space from which intelligibility emerges.  
 
4. ARTAUD, “JABBERWOCKY,” AND THE LINGUISTIC BORDER 
A curious episode in the career of the nonsense poems of Lewis Carroll is the way his poems 
were used in the therapeutic treatment of Antonin Artaud, the avant-garde French dramatist and 
poet, during a period in which Artaud was suffering from serious mental illness. During his 
confinement in an asylum in Rodez, Artaud was given an episode from Through the Looking 
Glass to translate as part of his therapy. Specifically, he was given the episode in which Humpty 
Dumpty explains to Alice the language and meaning of ―Jabberwocky.‖ What Artaud produced 
was not so much a translation, but a text that buried meaning further into the clouds of nonsense. 
He coined French neologisms for English nonsense words, which in no way correspond to the 
original text. Rather than working as therapy, Artaud‘s ―translation‖ revealed a realm of 
language and meaning that was peculiar to his madness. In the course of this process of 
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―translation,‖ the line between the clinical and the literary became equally indistinct. This would 
be little more than a curiosity were it not for the fact that these kinds of linguistic aberrations 
reveal aspects of mental illness that have everything to do with the overall function of language 
in any speaking subject. Artaud‘s experiment lays bare the blurred region of linguistic machinery 
that escapes the regulated order of language by which we communicate. This region of language 
defies the strict order of the signifier, an order that demands coherence and accord with symbolic 
psychic structures. The work of language that we have come to define as artistic or literary plays 
with language quite consciously. Artaud‘s pathological linguistic forms operate in a borderline 
realm of language and meaning, a psychological space in which access to language becomes 
occluded but not entirely lost. 
Artaud‘s encounter with the nonsense poems of Lewis Carroll was intended be a form of 
therapy. Instead, this encounter revealed some crucial features of language that underpin literary 
language in general. Artaud was able to create his own linguistic sense, which breaks from the 
original English but retains the form (if not the function) of language. Artaud‘s poetic translation 
gave way to another level of nonsense, a nonsense that coheres in ways that are analogous to the 
original nonsense; it is here that we find a window into linguistic operations that are on the 
border of the sane and the insane, the signifying function of language itself, and the border 
between literary language and language in general. Lukes (2013) explains that in Artaud‘s 
translation, we arrive at the border between the clinical and the literary: 
 
Because grammatical and syntactical coherence is what sustains the logical structure of 
language and, ultimately, holds language together, disrupting syntax amounts to chaos, 
silence, or madness. Yet what this cursory reading fails to grasp is the importance that 
derives from the fact that Artaud‘s broken language and cries find their origin in a process of 
translation. As indicators of singularity, his invented syllables and guttural cries intern their 
utterer within the walls of his utterance; but, as products of translation (albeit of an 
unconventional nature), they propel their author into a skewed conversation with another 
voice, establishing and subverting a literary and cultural filiation with the genre of nonsense-
writing. (Lukes, 2013: 107) 
 
If we stop at the fact that Artaud ultimately failed to translate Carroll‘s language and 
thereby further enclosed himself in the prison of his own delusional state, we fail to see that the 
―unregulated‖ psyche, as it grapples with nonsense, actually finds a point of purchase that shines 
a light on the mechanism of nonsense, especially in relation to more commonly accepted 
language. The signifying function, which is alleged to attend the fully integrated self or ego, is 
never completely removed from the border phase in which the ego experiments with the 
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signifying function without properly being integrated into the symbolic order that regulates 
language and structures the ego. The physician attending Artaud, Dr. Ferdière, understood that 
Artaud‘s creations had blurred the lines between the sane and the insane. What is more important 
for our purposes is that this border or blurred line cuts across the clinical and the critical:  
Ferdière brings together examples of verbal creation taken from translations of Carroll, 
children‘s nursery rhymes, poets‘ verbal collages, and schizophrenics‘ utterances, with a 
view to examining the unstable boundary between ‗santé‘ and ‗maladie mentale‘. From these 
comments it becomes apparent that the context in which Artaud‘s translation was solicited 
and produced is one that conjoins the medical and literary fields; in such a context, 
translation becomes an activity that lies at the intersection of the clinical and the critical, 
treading a fine line between madness and therapy. (Lukes, 2013: 108) 
The psychological structures at work in the language games found in Artaud‘s translation 
and in Carroll‘s nonsense poem further reveal the thin line between meaning and nonsense, sane 
and insane, and the clinical and the literary.  
Lacan‘s famous formula, S/s, would situate language acquisition and the integration of the 
ego in a strict direction. As one emerges as a fully integrated ego and assumes the signifying 
function of language—that is, as subjectivity is sutured onto the regulating mechanisms of the 
symbolic order—the outcome is clear-cut: one enters into language, and the ego is fully formed. 
That is all. What this means is that the signifier takes primacy over the signified in the course of 
the normal function of language. The meaning of a word is derived from its relation to other 
words. This is a social relation. The normal workings of an integrated self in a socially cohesive 
structure finds access to language from within this system. Nonetheless, Julia Kristeva (1982) 
intervenes on this strict system of order, arguing for a more indistinct realm of language and 
meaning that cannot be entirely contained in the order of S/s. Shuli Barzilai (1991) emphasizes 
Kristeva‘s theories of the borders in her critique of the Lacanian formula. Following Kristeva, 
Barzilai emphasizes the fact that some so-called pathological language functions are in fact 
creative rather than strictly pathological. Barzilai explains that ―the algorithm [Lacan‘s S/s] 
inadequately accounts for nondiscursive pathological and creative phenomena, for an 
experiential dimension (whether lived or, say, literary) that eludes the language function‖ 
(Barzilai, 1991: 294). These pathological and creative phenomena certainly can be pathological 
symptoms of mental illness. However, these same phenomena can also consist of the creative use 
of language, which deliberately manipulates the codified order of a signifying function. It should 
come as no surprise that Freud was just as interested in jokes as he was in dreams. Part of the 
reason certain types of humor strike us as funny is because it manipulates our sense of order in 
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relation to the symbolic. Something is funny because it does not ―add up‖ in terms of how a 
given form of meaning should unfold. 
Barzilai is careful to point out that these language games reveal a border rather than a 
legitimate transgression. One cannot, ultimately, step out of the symbolic order, because this is 
the only way any kind of meaning can exist. The social relations, both conscious and 
unconscious, are the product of language and subjectivity: ―The borderline is where the 
sovereignty of the sign is threatened and where something wild, something irreducible to 
language, emerges. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is a border, not a beyond, of 
language. The dissolution of the sign is, Kristeva stresses, only ‗relative‘, and a ‗semblance of 
socialization‘ is sometimes maintained‖ (Barzilai, 1991: 295).  
Yet, it is this border that demonstrates the locus of the literary force of the nonsense poem, 
and poetry more generally: ―The borders of the symbolic system are where art, or certain types 
of art, emerges as well‖ (296). At the outer reaches of the unconscious symbolic order, we find 
the linguistic and psychological conditions of possibility for literary language. That this language 
abuts the border of the literary, the clinical, and the insane is all due to the fact that this type of 
language does not properly conform to the strict definitions of how language is alleged to 
function. Literary language operates at or near the terrain of the language of psychosis (Ibid.: 
296). This border region of language and subjectivity made it possible for Artaud, in the throes 
of madness, to latch onto another language that is ostensibly a language of madness, and 
ultimately produce another mad language. The nonsense poem forces literary language further 
out to the margins of sanity, even as the starting point for poetic language was one that comes 
close to the language of psychosis.  
One final but absolutely crucial point Barzilai offers is that this border area of language is 
preserved in the unconscious. The borderline is not a phase through which a subject passes and 
then proceeds to full subjectivity and maturity, leaving behind this phase of transition. The 
border region of language acquisition, which plays at language without coming fully under the 
domination of the symbolic order, is a feature of human subjectivity, and this remains within the 
unconscious, albeit repressed. Again, drawing on Kristeva, Barzilai explains that the borderline 
is not a special case of language, but rather a feature of language in general: ―This ‗special‘ case 
is an epitome of the speaking subject at large; instead of regarding the borderline as a 
pathological entity, Kristeva sees in it a pervasive aspect of the human condition. Border effects 
are to be found in the discourse of everyday life‖ (Ibid.: 296). 
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5. OPENING SPACE FOR LITERARY SIGNIFICANCE VIA BORDERLINE 
LANGUAGE 
The borderline of language, which reveals the symptoms of insanity and allows for the creation 
of poetic language, also opens us to multiple modes of accessibility for ambivalent literary texts 
such as children‘s nonsense poems. 
Artaud performed nearly identical linguistic maneuvers in his translation of the same text. 
Artaud‘s translation, mediated through profound mental illness, transformed Carroll‘s language 
into a kind of French nonsense language that defies further translation. In fact, what happens in 
Humpty Dumpty‘s interpretation of ―Jabberwocky‖ is almost identical to the textual and 
linguistic mutilation that occurs in Artaud‘s delusional translations. Lukes shows us how far 
afield Artaud‘s text becomes as she explains the type of mangling of language that occurs in his 
text: 
 
The reader‘s sense of unease reaches its apex when he is confronted with a block of 
apparently incomprehensible syllabic units, set off from the rest of the text, that purport to be 
a paragraph-translation of Carroll‘s one-word poem title ―Jabberwocky‖: 
NEANT OMO NOTAR NEMO  
Jurigastri—Solargultri  
Gabar Uli—Barangoumti  
Oltar Ufi—Sarangmumpti  
Sofar Ami—Tantar Upti Momar  
Uni—Septfar Esti  
Gonpar Arak—Alak Eli (Lukes, 2013: 106) 
 
These lines constitute Artaud‘s translation of the title, not the opening lines of the poem. 
This demonstrates the extent to which mental illness disturbs language function. Both Artaud and 
Humpty Dumpy reveal the uncodified realm of language, which operates in the borderline 
between non-language and language that is rigidly codified and ordered by the unconscious 
symbolic.  
―Brillig‖ is obviously a made-up word. It does, however, function as a signifier. The 
signified can only be conjectured based on context. On the one hand, Humpty Dumpty‘s 
conclusion is as good as anyone‘s. On the other hand, there is no support for any conclusion. The 
object—the signified—simply does not exist except to the extent that we as readers are able to 
conjure some collection of ideas that suit the purpose: to create meaning in the poem. What 
unfolds in the exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty takes on the appearance of a break 
between signifier and signified. We can see the effacement not of the signifier and the signified, 
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but of the social function that renders the signifier meaningful at all. It is cut off from its only 
function, which is to attach meaning to a social system of meaning, that is, to attach the subject 
to a social register of self-awareness in language.  
In addition to this pseudo-psychotic detachment from the signifying process, Humpty 
Dumpty‘s next textual gloss consists of his well-known use of portmanteau words. When asked 
the meaning of ―slithy,‖ Humpty Dumpty explains: ―Well, ‗slithy‘ means ‗lithe and slimy.‘ 
‗Lithe‘ is the same as ‗active.‘ You see it‘s like a portmanteau—there are two meanings packed 
into one word.‖ The portmanteau works to the extent that it makes sense of a word that otherwise 
is completely inexplicable. On the other hand, the portmanteau creates yet another potential 
problem. The sublation of one term to another, which is a central component to the formation of 
signifiers in the social register, is left incomplete in the case of the portmanteau.5 There is no 
synthesis in the course of the dialectic of terms that give rise to a word.  
A term takes its meaning in relation to another term. This is the fundamental feature of 
linguistics. In this way, all words are effectively metaphors. The English term ―moon‖ comes 
from the Latin mensis, which means month or the cycle of the moon. The French word ―lune‖ is 
derived from the Latin lux, meaning light. Words do not correspond to things. They correspond 
to other words, and this is what is meant by the signifying chain that gives us unified language 
and speech. The portmanteau word effectively nullifies the metaphorical process by which a 
word is formed. In order for lux to become lune, the second term must negate the first while 
preserving the idea intrinsic to the first term; in this way, the second term emerges as the 
signifier, which signifies a cultural and social understanding of the celestial object in the sky. In 
the case of the portmanteau word, both terms are preserved. On the one hand, this language game 
is part of the appeal for the child reader especially. On the other hand, the presence of a 
portmanteau word presents us with a problematic psychological aspect of the text.  
The dialectical work of metaphor operates in terms of Freud‘s ―Mourning and 
Melancholia.‖ The movement from one term to another necessarily entails the loss of one object 
in favor of another, even as this process preserves some feature of meaning from the lost object.6 
The meaning of the first term is preserved in the second by way of the dialectic of mourning and 
melancholia. When one loses a loved one, the loss will naturally trigger an intense longing for 
the lost object. The psychic investment in this object cannot be withdrawn easily, and the subject 
will cling to the object even in its absence. The work of mourning is the primary path of psychic 
energy, and the libidinal investment in the lost object will finally be resolved as the unconscious 
becomes able to introject some notional aspect of the lost object into the grieving ego. The 
psychological process allows the grieving subject to retain a notional feature of the lost object 
and incorporates this feature into the ego. This is the proper resolution to loss. In the case of 
melancholia, no such resolution occurs, and the ego will endlessly substitute other objects in 
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place of the lost object. The libidinal investment is in loss itself. This becomes manifest in 
obvious symptoms of melancholia, but it is also manifest in the form of fetish objects: substitute 
objects that carry some form of unconscious association with the lost object (Freud, 1917: 154–
55). In melancholia, there is a disavowal of the objective world in favor of a pathological 
libidinal investment in a lost, loved object. The subject runs toward a narcissistic investment in 
which they refuse to mourn the lost object and become psychologically invested in loss itself. In 
this case, phantasmatic objects will necessarily stand in for an object which simply does not exist 
in objective reality. This is, in fact, precisely what occurs in the case of the portmanteau word. A 
term such as ―slithy,‖ and Humpty Dumpty‘s explanation of the term, leaves in place the two 
terms for objects without ever resolving the conflict between the presence of one object and 
another. This does not preserve the meaning of both words, but rather, creates the space for a 
phantasm that displaces both terms. Humpty Dumpty‘s explanation fails not because it is 
illogical, but because it fails to account for the truly phantasmatic character of a slithy object. It 
is not real and cannot be made to be real. This has affinities with melancholic irresolution, which 
is pathological rather than charming.  
Yet, this same process is the realm in which the objects of poetic language can emerge. In 
preserving multiple valences of meaning, poetic language can manipulate the processes of 
mourning and melancholia to produce varying levels of meaning. A central difference between 
poetic language and ordinary rhetorical forms entails a deliberate modification, or 
―deformation,‖ to use Shavit‘s term. As Giorgio Agamben explains: ―If the external world is in 
fact narcissistically denied to the melancholic as an object of love, the phantasm yet receives 
from this negation a reality principle and emerges from the mute interior crypt in order to enter 
into a new and fundamental dimension. No longer a phantasm and not yet a sign, the unreal 
object of melancholy introjection opens a space that is neither the hallucinated oneiric scene of 
phantasms nor the indifferent world of natural objects‖ (Agamben, 1993: 25). 
The ―space‖ Agamben describes is in fact that borderline space that Barzilai introduces 
from Kristeva. It is in this borderline area that we encounter the space, or topology in Agamben‘s 
terms, of the poetic, the mad, and the child: ―The topology that is here expressed tentatively in 
the language of psychology has always been known to children, fetishists, ‗savages,‘ and poets‖ 
(Ibid.: 59). The ambivalent text reaches and reveals this borderline, and it is the common access 
to this borderline in both children and adults that renders some ―children‘s‖ literature particularly 
appealing to both mature and immature readers. 
Portmanteau words and the illogical claims of mastery that defy the social realm may be 
symptoms of insanity, as in Artaud‘s delusional appropriation of Through the Looking Glass and 
his belief that Carroll plagiarized Artaud‘s work, even though Carroll had written nearly a 
hundred years prior. At the same time, these types of linguistic games are at the heart of poetic 
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language and of the playful use of language by children—even children who have not fully 
mastered language. The ambivalent text is particularly adept at dwelling in this borderline space 
of meaning, this region in which meaning has not gained mastery over the speaking subject and 
has not been fully integrated into strict signifying functions. The pleasure of the text for both 
adults and children lies in ―a pleasure originating in the vacuity of meaning and of the signifier 
that is lacking in logical discourse‖ (Marret, 1993). This lack of meaning and logic reveals the 
play that is at work in the borderline.  
6. CONCLUSION
The borderline preserves the undifferentiated and phantasmatic play of meaning that underpins 
any subjective access to language. While the borderline becomes visible in the symptoms of 
psychosis, it is due to the pathological breakdown of the language function with respect to 
subjectivity and the subjective integrity of the mentally ill. For healthy readers, we gain access to 
the types of language characteristic of the borderline via poetic language. Nonsense language and 
nonsense poems, which are most often aimed at child readers, offer a striking case of poetic 
language that operates squarely on the borderline at the recesses of language functions. The case 
of Artaud shows us that symptoms of madness as expressed in nonsense language operate in the 
same terrain as the nonsense of children‘s poetry. Artaud‘s translation makes as much sense as 
the exegesis given by Carroll as Humpty Dumpty. Since this border region of language is 
retained by the healthy adult reader, it would appear that a text such as ―Jabberwocky‖ can speak 
to both the child and adult reader because it speaks to a region of understanding common to both, 
and is simultaneously implicit in the interpretive strategies of both. Children‘s literature, 
particularly those texts that reach across the literary–didactic split, contain meanings that are at 




 James Kincaid offers a complex analysis of the literary/historical invention of the child and childhood. 
Again, childhood—and by extension, children‘s literature—are historical contingencies that cannot be 
pinned down to a stable category: ―The child is not a fixed counter, even in photographs, and acts not 
simply as a distant allurement but as a moving conveyer belt, propelling the adult dreamer into the child' 
s world, a world that immediately becomes the sole property of the dreamer‖ (Kincaid, 1991: 4). In 
Kincaid‘s view, childhood and the child are projections of the adult.  
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 Even Lear‘s ―The Jumblies‖ is treated as a symptom of Victorian cultural anxieties. The antagonism 
between one‘s allegiance to the social order and the demand to express oneself is seen as one such 
cultural conflict at work in Lear‘s nonsense poetry. It is precisely through the poetic play of nonsense that 
we see how ―he addresses himself to the plight of the individual faced with either a nameless mass 
society or an indifferent Nature before whom he is distinctly alone and ‗other‘‖ (Hark, 1978: 113).  
3
 A reference to Beowulf: A New Verse Translation (Heaney, 2000). 
4
 The turn toward the ―I‖ is indicative of schizophrenia. The hyper-reflexivity that leads to a dissolution 
of the self is first manifested as a morbid preoccupation with the self. It is this turn inward that Sass cites 
as symptomatic of schizophrenia. These symptoms indicate hyper-rationality as opposed to conventional 
accounts of schizophrenia. As Sass explains, schizophrenia is ―far from necessarily sustaining a sense of 
self, a strong observing ego may actually undermine it. Dissolution of self need not, it seems, necessarily 
be taken as indicating a primitive or Dionysian absence of reflective awareness‖ (Sass, 1987: 18). 
Humpty Dumpty displays the onset of schizophrenic symptoms with his rhetorical maneuver of mastery 
over language.  
5
 On semiotics, metaphor, and sublation, see Rowlinson (1993).  
6
 For a sustained analysis of the structure and function of metaphor, see Sobolev (2008). 
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